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Abstract. In the absence of a fundamental theory that precisely predicts values
for observable parameters, anthropic reasoning attempts to constrain probability
distributions over those parameters in order to facilitate the extraction of testable
predictions. The utility of this approach has been vigorously debated of late,
particularly in light of theories that claim we live in a multiverse, where parameters
may take differing values in regions lying outside our observable horizon. Within this
cosmological framework, we investigate the efficacy of top-down anthropic reasoning
based on the weak anthropic principle. We argue contrary to recent claims that it is
not clear one can either dispense with notions of typicality altogether or presume
typicality, in comparing resulting probability distributions with observations. We
show in a concrete, top-down setting related to dark matter, that assumptions about
typicality can dramatically affect predictions, thereby providing a guide to how errors
in reasoning regarding typicality translate to errors in the assessment of predictive
power. We conjecture that this dependence on typicality is an integral feature of
anthropic reasoning in broader cosmological contexts, and argue in favour of the explicit
inclusion of measures of typicality in schemes invoking anthropic reasoning, with a view
to extracting predictions from multiverse scenarios.
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1. Introduction
Generating testable predictions from theories positing the existence of a multiverse
remains one of the key barriers to the broader appeal of multiverse proposals. There
are a variety of contemporary theoretical ideas that give rise to multiverse proposals,
including those based on inflationary cosmology [1, 2, 3], and the string theory
landscape [4, 5, 6, 7]. In each case, short of a definite prediction for parameters of
interest, one expects the theory to provide a probability distribution spread over some
range, out of which parameters take their values. Comparisons between values that we
observe and the values that are predicted by the theory through the distribution, can be
used as a way of assessing the theory’s predictive power, can help explain why parameters
take their observed values, and can in principle help us determine whether the observed
values provide support for the theory. This multifaceted role, coupling prediction,
explanation and potential theory confirmation, makes the task of understanding how to
compare observed values with a theory-generated probability distribution, an important
step in establishing the validity of proposals for the multiverse.
Owing to the presumed parsimony of description that any fundamental theory of the
universe is likely to exhibit, together with the complex nature of our local conditions, a
probability distribution generated from theory alone may not be enough to narrow down
observations that we are likely to make [8]. It has been argued that conditionalization
may be necessary to restrict the distribution in such a way that sharpens the comparison
between theory and observation [8, 9, 10]. There exist a range of approaches one can
take, which in effect institute successively more restricted versions of the weak anthropic
principle [11]. The least restricted version does not conditionalize the distribution at
all and has been referred to as the “bottom-up” approach [9, p. 3]. The most restricted
version includes every piece of experimental information available, and is known as
the “top-down” approach [9, p. 3]. An intermediate choice, which one can think of
as interpolating between the two, is that of selecting a set of constraints that we
believe are compatible with our existence, though not necessarily inclusive of every
piece of available experimental evidence. This approach represents a way to restrict the
bottom-up distribution to one that explicitly references our existence, while avoiding
the complexity demanded by the top-down description, making the requisite comparison
between our observations of a parameter of interest and the distribution out of which
that parameter is drawn, potentially more immediate. This strategy has been termed
the “anthropic approach”, though we will refer to anything that is not the bottom-up
approach and that lies on this “spectrum of conditionalization” as an anthropic approach
(see Aguirre and Tegmark [9, p. 3]).
The choice of a particular conditionalization scheme may well not be enough,
however. A second choice needs to be made regarding whether one believes that our
observations are randomly selected from the distribution. Namely, are we a typical
member of the class of observers implicitly defined by the conjunction of the theory
and the conditionalization scheme [10, 12, 13, 14, 15]? Indeed, as we will examine, the
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predictions of this conjunction crucially depend upon the answer that one adopts to this
question.‡
The two controversies then, regarding a suitable conditionalization scheme for a
theory-generated probability distribution, and whether we can then assume we are
typical of the observers implied, have shaped recent debates into the predictive power
of multiverse proposals. Weinstein advocates the top-down approach as the preferred
method of conditionalization, and claims in that context, one can do away with the
need for a stance on typicality with respect to the resulting distribution [10]. Garriga
and Vilenkin support prediction based upon the presumption that we are members of a
reference class of observers who have “identical information content” [13, p. 043526-1], in
which case they claim that we can assume we are typical observers. Srednicki and Hartle
argue that even within the context of conditionalization that rests on the presumption of
different observers in the multiverse having identical data, assumptions about typicality
need to be built-in to the theory-generated distribution, and that predictive power
should thereby be evaluated in the context of a conjunction consisting of the theory, the
conditionalization scheme and assumptions regarding typicality [14]. In a sense then,
each of these three proposals operate within a scheme most similar to the top-down
approach to conditionalization, but assume very different positions regarding how one
should treat typicality, and therefore make radically different statements about how one
should compare observations with theory.
In this paper we address this controversy from complementary points of view.
We argue that conceptually, it is not clear who or what the constraints proposed
in the context of top-down schemes imply, and that therefore any presumption of a
lack of need to invoke a stance on typicality, or indeed the presumption of typicality
itself is premature. We then show by way of a concrete example related to recent
discussions about dark matter, that top-down conditionalization allows for mutually
exclusive predictions regarding the number of dominant species contributing to the
total dark matter density, depending upon the assumptions one makes about typicality.
In this way, one’s stance on typicality strongly influences the prediction, and then an
incorrect presumption about the former can translate into a misunderstanding about the
latter. We thereby side with Srednicki and Hartle in proposing that if one is interested
in extracting predictions from theory-generated probability distributions via top-down
reasoning, one must explicitly include an exhaustive set of typicality assumptions in the
analysis [14]. Without such an approach, anthropic reasoning may play little role in
helping to extract predictions from multiverse proposals.
2. Inherent ambiguities in uniquely characterizing ‘us’
There exist multiverse scenarios within the context of both inflationary cosmology and
string theory that give rise to physical conditions in which our domain (or universe)
‡ The assertion that we are typical, is commonly referred to as the “principle of mediocrity”, as
formulated by Vilenkin [16, p. 847].
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is unlikely. Rather than consequently dismissing these scenarios by virtue of them not
being predictive (of our domain), the weak anthropic principle (WAP) can be invoked to
help refine the analysis of their predictive power. This principle was introduced by Carter
in 1974, in the context of attempting to explain coincidences between cosmological
parameters. It takes the following form:
WAP: “...what we can expect to observe must be restricted by the
conditions necessary for our presence as observers.” [11, p. 291].
The idea is that one can use the WAP to restrict attention to the types of domains that
we might expect to see, as generated by the theory under consideration, and then one
can ask whether the restricted theory is compatible with our observations. It is clear
that there is a large ambiguity inherent in the WAP, in that it doesn’t specify precisely
who or what it is referring to. Weinstein attempts to address this ambiguity, and in
doing so claims that there exists a version of the WAP that does away with the need
for subsequent presumptions about typicality in order to extract predictions [10]. We
argue that this is far from clear.
Weinstein demarcates two versions of this principle. In his notation, we can
interpret the WAP to mean either of the following:
WAP1: “What we can expect to observe must be restricted by the
conditions necessary for our presence.” [10, p. 4234],
WAP2: “What we can expect to observe must be restricted by the
conditions necessary for the presence of observers.” [10, p. 4234].
The crux of Weinstein’s argument is that if we think of the WAP as referring to
conditions that are necessary for “the presence of observers” (Weinstein’s WAP2), then
we need to specify what these observers are, and to invoke a measure of (our) typicality
within this reference class in order to extract a testable prediction. Indeed the term
“observers” invokes a potentially large class of beings of which we may or may not
be typical. Weinstein’s issue with this approach is precisely the need to invoke the
(potentially) “misguided and unjustified” assumption of typicality [10, p. 4231].
If, however, we think of the WAP as referring to conditions that are necessary for
us (Weinstein’s WAP1), Weinstein argues that the probability distributions that obtain
have immediate significance for the predictive power of the theory under consideration.
If that theory predicts that we should observe the values that we do with a non-zero
probability, then it is in fact correctly predicting our observation. The purported lack
of reliance of this version of the WAP on (what he deems to be) the contentious extra
assumption of typicality, leads him to endorse the use of WAP1 over WAP2.
Our concern is that it is not clear how to characterize ‘us’, i.e., what is it that
we are supposed to be characterizing and how does one translate this into a set of
physical constraints that imply the existence of the thing being characterized in an
unambiguous way? Ambiguities in addressing this concern will translate into ambiguities
in interpreting the predictive power of any probability distribution that falls out of the
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theory. In light of this uncertainty, it appears that a notion of typicality might need to
be included in any analysis resting upon WAP1, and then Weinstein’s misgivings about
WAP2 carry over to WAP1 as well.
Weinstein offers a way to partially address our concern by suggesting that we
condition on “as detailed a description as possible” [10, p. 4235], namely, that we
should condition on observed values of cosmological parameters (say) in order to make
subsequent predictions. This suggestion mirrors one made by Garriga and Vilenkin [13].
They argue that the reference class of observers who share “identical information
content” with us is a class within which we can assume typicality [13, p. 043526-1].
Our concern in this context is that if we condition along the lines of either account,
it is not clear who or what is implied by the conjunction of the underlying theory
and the constraints. We cannot deduce what ‘everything we know’ or the entirety
of our information content gives rise to, and so it may be premature to ignore issues
regarding typicality as suggested in the former case, or indeed to presume typicality
as recommended in the latter. In the context of Garriga and Vilenkin’s suggestion,
our concern regarding the presumption of typicality manifests with greater immediacy
given their own admission that from an operational point of view, it would be difficult
to include in the analysis “the full information content of observers” and that “by
necessity, we need to consider a reference class of observers specified by a small subset of
all available information” [13, p. 043526-2]. It seems that only approximate conditions
that specify “our presence” can be invoked in any practical calculation. The basic
indeterminacy that accompanies any attempt to narrow down a class of observers who
accord in an unambiguous way with us, makes it difficult to see how one can suspend the
need to take a stance regarding typicality (as Weinstein advocates), or indeed how one
can assert it without worrying about the potential for generating spurious predictions
(as is potentially the case with the argument of Garriga and Vilenkin).
In the following section we take a more quantitative viewpoint and show that in
at least one (rather stylized) theoretical example, conditionalizing one’s distribution in
a way that accords with the top-down approach gives results that clearly depend upon
whether one assumes typicality with respect to the reference class implicitly invoked.
We characterize how this dependence manifests itself, providing a sense of the nature
of the predictive errors one is vulnerable to, in the case where one takes an incorrect
stance on typicality.
3. Typicality and dark matter
One cosmological context in which arguments of the above form can play an important
role is that of dark matter. The most popular current theory concerning the composition
of dark matter is that it exists in the form of new non-baryonic particle species [17, 18].
There are a broad range of candidate particles that have been put forward, including
weakly interacting massive particles, for which vigorous experimental searches are
currently in progress [19]. It has not been ruled out that more than one dark
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matter particle candidate could contribute to the total dark matter density of the
universe [9, 18, 20], and it is within this context that we will focus our theoretical
concerns.
Consider then the case where there are N > 1 dark matter particle species that
contribute to the observed dark matter density. Following [9], we assume that these
species have densities {ρi}
N
i=1, which are given by a dimensionless dark matter-to-baryon
ratio, ρi := Ωi/Ωb, for i = 1, . . . , N . These densities represent a random variable whose
joint probability distribution is set by a theory that gives rise to a multiverse, with
dark matter density components sampled from this distribution. We are interested in
attempting to predict the total number of dark matter particle species that contribute
to the observed dark matter density ρo =
∑N
i=1 ρi, while closely monitoring how this
prediction varies with typicality assumptions. We are furthermore interested in the top-
down case of Aguirre and Tegmark [9], which corresponds most closely to Weinstein’s
WAP1 (see also Aguirre [21]). In setting up the problem (section 3.1), we closely follow
the exposition of [9].
3.1. The top-down approach of Aguirre and Tegmark
We assume that the dark matter particle species are independent, i.e., the joint
probability density function P (ρ1, ρ2, . . . , ρN) factorizes into a product of marginals,
P (ρ1, ρ2, . . . , ρN) =
N∏
i=1
Pi(ρi). (1)
We will consider those components that have significant probability of occurrence near
or above the observed value ρi ∼ ρo as (following [9]) we’ll assume that those components
with significant probability weight at densities much smaller than ρo, do in fact take
those values, since there is no contradiction with this assumption and the constraint
that
∑N
i=1 ρi = ρo. This leaves Nbig dark matter components. We furthermore work
with the differential distribution in ln(ρi), that is, Pi := dpi(ρi)/d ln ρi = ρiPi(ρi), where
pi(ρi) is the cumulative probability distribution function for the density of species i.
Consider then the case of Nbig > 1.§ First, we’d like to find the densities of the
Nbig components that maximize the total probability Ptot ∝
∏
j Pj , subject to the
fact that we observe a total dark matter density of ρo =
∑
j ρj . This is simply a
constrained optimization problem whose solution can be found by using a Lagrange
multiplier λ, as in [9]. We want to maximize the expression Ptot − λ
∑
j ρj, or
equivalently, lnPtot − λ
∑
j ρj . Noting that the distribution Ptot factorizes, the solution
is d lnPi/dρi = λ [9]. One can then fix the Lagrange multiplier λ by enforcing the
constraint ρo =
∑
j ρj . Assuming a power law relation for the probabilities,
Pi ∝ ρ
βi
i , (2)
§ In what follows, we’ll assume we’ve relabelled the indices over the dark matter densities such that
the first Nbig indices refer to the Nbig significant dark matter components.
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one can readily show that the solution to the constrained optimization problem is given
by
ρi =
(
βi
β
)
ρo, (3)
where β =
∑
i βi. Aguirre and Tegmark go on to claim that although the exponents βi
may be different, rendering many fewer dominant dark matter components than Nbig, in
the absence of any further information, there is an argument that can be made that they
are in fact similar, and that thereby there could be many components that contribute
to the total dark matter density.
In this fashion, they conclude that under top-down conditionalization, that is,
where one conditionalizes the distribution based on one’s observations (in this case,
the total dark matter density), one predicts the existence of several dark matter species,
contributing roughly equally to the total dark matter density.
It is important to note that in the above argument, Aguirre and Tegmark have
assumed that the condition that maximizes the probability is the one that determines
what the theory predicts. In other words, they have assumed a very specific form of
typicality in their construction, which presumes we will observe values that are most
likely to occur, given the theory and the conditionalization scheme adopted. In what
follows, we look into the consequences of relaxing this assumption, and show under this
condition that a radically different picture emerges.
3.2. Relaxing typicality
Consider then what happens to the predictions of section 3.1 when we do not demand
optimality from our distribution. We’ll first consider the simplest nontrivial case where
the number of significant dark matter particle species contributing to the total dark
matter density is Nbig = 2.
3.2.1. Nbig = 2. In this case, the distribution Ptot takes on its maximal value, PMAXtot ,
when equations (2) and (3) hold with i = 1, 2:
PMAXtot ∝
[(
β1
β
)
ρo
]β1 [(β2
β
)
ρo
]β2
= ρβ1+β2o
(
β1
β
)β1 (β2
β
)β2
. (4)
The prediction in section 3.1, of multiple dark matter species contributing to the total
dark matter density depends on β1 ≈ β2. We’ll investigate the suboptimal situation
under the assumption that the power laws determining the behaviour of the relevant
distributions have the same exponent, where the value of that exponent is consistent
with the requirement that we’re looking at two components with significant probability
near the relatively high value of ρo. To that end, let β1 = β2 = β
⋆ > 1. The optimal
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ρMAXi then becomes ρ
MAX
i = (1/2)ρo. Also,
PMAXtot ∝ ρ
2β⋆
o
(
1
2
)2β⋆
. (5)
Now away from the maximum, on the constraint surface (ρ1 + ρ2 = ρo),
Ptot ∝ ρ
β⋆
1 (ρo − ρ1)
β⋆ . (6)
We’ll consider the size of Ptot relative to PMAXtot as we scale ρ1 away from its optimal
value of ρMAX1 = (1/2)ρo. To this end let
ρ1 = ǫ
1
2
ρo, (7)
where 0 ≤ ǫ ≤ 2, and consider the resulting fractional probability, Ptot/PMAXtot . A quick
calculation shows that
Ptot
PMAXtot
= [ǫ (2− ǫ)]β
⋆
. (8)
The limit of interest here, can more clearly be explored by noting that equation (8)
implies:
ǫ = 1±
√
1− (Ptot/PMAXtot )1/β
⋆ . (9)
For a fixed β⋆, a sufficiently improbable situation, where Ptot/P
MAX
tot ≪ 1, will force ǫ
to take values near either 0 or 2. In either case, we are left with a single dominant dark
matter species.‖
Sufficiently far away from optimality then, the conclusion of the existence of
multiple dark matter species contributing equally to the total observed dark matter
density breaks down, and the prediction takes a new form. What we can expect to
observe, depends upon whether we assume we will observe typical values from the
distribution. Though perhaps this is to be expected, our point is that this holds even in
the case of top-down conditionalization, namely, that assumptions regarding typicality
play a role in the case most similar in spirit to the style of reasoning endorsed by
Weinstein’s WAP1. For the sake of completeness, we’ll show that this result also holds
in the case where we let Nbig > 2.
3.2.2. Nbig = N ≥ 2. In the general case Nbig = N ≥ 2, combining equations (2)
and (3) gives,
Ptot
PMAXtot
=
1
ρβo
N∏
i=1
(
β
βi
)βi
ρβii . (10)
We’ll again perform calculations in the case where the power law exponents have the
same value, i.e., βi = β
⋆ > 1, for i = 1, 2, . . . ,N . Noting then that β = Nβ⋆,
Ptot
PMAXtot
=
(
N
ρo
)Nβ⋆ N∏
i=1
ρβ
⋆
i . (11)
‖ Our considerations are made under the assumption that the power law dependence of the probability
(equation (2)) remains valid. A less stylized calculation would need to address the issue of potential
deviations from this dependence when assessing how dominant one species could be in principle.
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To investigate the behaviour of this function, we’ll explore the possibility of ρi being
the dominant contributing species for i = 1, though the argument works for any species
i. In particular, we’ll monitor the density ρ1 as it deviates from its optimal value of
ρMAX1 = (1/N )ρo, where this deviation is controlled by a parameter ǫ:
ρ1 = ǫ
1
N
ρo, (12)
ρj = ρo
(
1−
ǫ
N
)( 1
N − 1
)
, (13)
with 0 ≤ ǫ ≤ N and j = 2, 3, . . . ,N . We’re thereby exploring the possibility of ρ1
dominating with each of the other components being reduced by an equivalent amount
with respect to their optimal values, such that the constraint
∑N
i=1 ρi = ρo is satisfied.
One can show then that the fractional probability (appropriately generalizing
equation (8)) is given by
Ptot
PMAXtot
=
[
ǫ(N − ǫ)N−1
(N − 1)N−1
]β⋆
. (14)
The behaviour of the term in brackets in equation (14), which we’ll refer to as
p(ǫ,N ) := ǫ(N − ǫ)N−1/(N − 1)N−1, is plotted in figure 1. We see there that for
appropriately low values of the fractional probability (depending of course upon β⋆),
one can make the dark matter species with density ρ1 dominate over the others. As N
gets larger, ρ1 dominates by a relatively smaller amount when compared with lower N
values. For example, if (Ptot/PMAXtot )
1/β⋆ = 0.010, then p(ǫ, 2) = 0.010 =⇒ ǫ = 1.995
(focusing only on the solution where ρ1 dominates), giving ρ1 = (1.995/2)ρo . On the
other hand, p(ǫ, 10) = 0.010 =⇒ ǫ = 5.539, giving ρ1 = (5.539/10)ρo.
The upshot is that for a fixed β⋆, the nature of our prediction, represented here by
the dominance of ρ1, is controlled by how small we allow (Ptot/PMAXtot )
1/β⋆ to be, namely,
the degree of atypicality we are willing to accept.
4. The spectrum of typicality
Accompanying the conditionalization scheme one might adopt to generate predictions
from a theory, is the decision one needs to make regarding the typicality of
our observations. In section 3, we demonstrated in a (single) concrete example,
the dependence of predictions on typicality under the assumption of top-down
conditionalization. One may argue that we have not gone far enough. That simply
constraining one variable of interest (in our case the total dark matter density) isn’t
enough to uniquely specify (or even approximate) “our presence” (as in WAP1) and
that thereby, one might expect to have to take a stance on how typical our observations
are. We do not exclude this possibility, but we question whether the situation will
change as we successively add further observational constraints (in the above top-
down fashion) until we have a distribution for some observational parameter that is the
result of conditionalizing a theory on “precise values for all cosmological parameters”
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Figure 1. Behaviour of p(ǫ,N ) = ǫ(N − ǫ)N−1/(N − 1)N−1 for Nbig = N . The
cases for N = 2, 4, 6, 8, 10 are shown as a function of ǫ ∈ [0,N ]. To the right of the
peak, higher N cases taper to 0 for higher values of ǫ. We note that for small values
of p(ǫ,N ), one can make the dark matter species represented by ρ1 dominate over the
other species, i.e, ǫ → N . The dashed line (ǫ = 1) corresponds to the optimal case of
all N species contributing equally to the observed dark matter density ρo.
(Weinstein [10, p. 4235]). Weinstein adds that under these circumstances, “there is
no need at all for a principle of mediocrity – no need to assume that we are typical
members of some larger ensemble. Taking selection effects as seriously as possible is
thus equivalent to appealing to WAP1 as a principle of inference.” [10, p. 4235]. We
contend that given a theory that proposes the existence of multiple copies of everything
we know, it is not clear that we can dispense with having to deal with whether we are
typical of what that theory gives rise to. In fact (in contrast to Garriga and Vilenkin),
we may well not be typical and then assuming that we are, will produce incorrect results.
To restate these claims in more familiar terminology, we are interested in using our
underlying theory T to make predictions for a yet unobserved parameter, say Λnew.¶
We conditionalize the theory-generated probability distribution P (Λnew|T ), by fixing the
values of all cosmological parameters in the theory (say ~λ) to their currently observed
values (giving ~λobs). Then from an operational point of view, Weinstein’s claim amounts
to computing P (Λnew|T , ~λobs), and then using this distribution to predict our future
measurement of Λnew, without concerning ourselves with whether we are typical of the
observers thus generated. In fact, he mentions that “if the theory assigns a non-vanishing
probability to the parameter values we do observe, then that is what we should expect
to observe.” [10, p. 4235]. Our contention is that it is not clear precisely who or what
¶ Note that we only consider here the case where we are interested in the predictive power of some
specified theory T . We aren’t necessarily comparing theories, in which case one might want to employ
Bayesian analyses in the style of Hartle and Srednicki [12, 14].
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is specified by fixing ~λ to our observed values, and that thereby one may be subject to
the same “inductive overreach” that Weinstein levels at WAP2 [10, p. 4231].
In this sense, our argument aligns with the claims of Srednicki and Hartle [14], who
argue (in the context of distributions conditionalized on our data) for the introduction of
a xerographic distribution that can enforce a spectrum of typicality assumptions. In fact
they argue for exploring schemes in which one can vary both the underlying theory T
and the xerographic distribution, to explore how predictive the combination of the two
are. A successful prediction (of some future observation) is one where the distribution
conditionalized on the conjunction of the theory, our data, and typicality assumption is
peaked around the value that we subsequently observe. We contend that any calculation
of the sort that gives rise to a distribution such as P (Λnew|T , ~λobs) should indeed be
supplemented by such a scheme in order to extract predictions. Simply conditionalizing
on everything we know isn’t enough.
5. Discussion
It is difficult to see how one would be able to dispense with typicality assumptions when
conditionalizing in a top-down fashion given that it is far from clear how to characterize
us. Weinstein’s effective claim about not requiring assumptions of typicality in the
context of distributions such as P (Λnew|T , ~λobs) (from section 4) requires that the sum
total of observational evidence we have at our disposal determines the existence of
creatures who accord in some unambiguous way with us. Garriga and Vilenkin’s claim
about the legitimacy of presuming typicality with respect to reference classes that share
all of our information content (and a small subset of this information content in more
concrete settings) is subject to the same concern regarding our ignorance about who or
what this prescription implies.
This problem becomes more acute if as we have shown in the restricted example
of section 3, the typical members of the distribution see one thing while the atypical
members see another. In the particular context considered there, demanding a low
fractional probability, i.e., demanding parameters sample from an atypical region of
the probability distribution, leads (under appropriate constraints) to the possibility of
a single dominant dark matter species. This prediction differs from the case where
we accept only the most probable (or under the appropriate conditions, typical) dark
matter densities as those that set the prediction.
In a sense, our argument here is in accord with what one might expect intuitively.
Abstracting away from more likely scenarios isn’t a priori inconsistent with obtaining
a different result. The key point is that when it is not clear that top-down
conditionalization leads uniquely to us, and when prediction is intimately entwined
with presumptions about typicality, either dispensing entirely with the need to consider
typicality, or automatically assuming typicality, seems presumptuous at best, or leads
to inferences that are plainly incorrect under less favourable circumstances. Typicality,
then, plays an important role in interpreting results (see [22]), and it may be best to
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explicitly include this in any analysis of predictive power as proposed by Srednicki and
Hartle [14].
Our focus has been on top-down reasoning, though we see no reason why our
arguments about the importance of considering typicality do not carry over to other cases
in Aguirre and Tegmark’s “spectrum of conditionalization” [9]. In this way, interactions
between the twin spectra of conditionalization and typicality determine the predictive
power of multiverse cosmological models, an interaction that needs to be accounted for
when we propose to test these models’ predictions against observational evidence.
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